The ring signature allows a signer to leak secrets anonymously, without the risk of identity escrow. At the same time, the ring signature provides great flexibility: No group manager, no special setup, and the dynamics of group choice. The ring signature is, however, vulnerable to malicious or irresponsible signers in some applications, because of its anonymity. In this paper, we propose a traceable ring signature scheme. A traceable ring scheme is a ring signature except that it can restrict "excessive" anonymity. The traceable ring signature has a tag that consists of a list of ring members and an issue that refers to, for instance, a social affair or an election. A ring member can make any signed but anonymous opinion regarding the issue, but only once (per tag). If the member submits another signed opinion, possibly pretending to be another person who supports the first opinion, the identity of the member is immediately revealed. If the member submits the same opinion, for instance, voting "yes" regarding the same issue twice, everyone can see that these two are linked. The traceable ring signature can suit to many applications, such as an anonymous voting on a BBS, a dishonest whistle-blower problem, and unclonable group identification. We formalize the security definitions for this primitive and show an efficient and simple construction.
Introduction
A ring signature scheme allows a signer to sign a message while preserving anonymity behind a group, called a "ring," which is selected by the signer. A verifier can check the validity of the signature, but cannot know who generated it among all possible ring members. In addition, two signatures generated by the same singer are unlinkable. Namely, it is infeasible for the verifier to determine whether the signatures are generated by the same signer. This notion was first formally introduced by Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman [31] , and since then, this topic has been studied extensively, in, for instance [26, 10, 1, 24, 23, 7] . The ring signature is related to group signature, due to [15] , but it is incomparable. Although the group signature [15, 11, 3, 2, 5, 8, 22, 6 ] also allows a signer to generate a signer-ambiguous (and unlinkable) signature, it has a group manager that has the power to revoke the anonymity of any signer if necessary. A group manager must establish a special type of key assignment to create a group, and hence it is difficult to change the group dynamically. In addition, some people say that the group manager is too strong because he can even revoke the anonymity of a honest signer. On the other hand, a ring signature scheme has no group manager, no special setup, and allows ad-hoc group formation. In other words, a signer can choose as a "ring" an arbitrary set of possible signers (who in advance registered themselves to PKI) including himself, and sign a message using only his own secret key. However, the ring signature does not have an anonymity revocation protocol in general.
Anonymity is not always good. While the group signature has too strong a traceability characteristic, an ordinary ring signature scheme has nothing at all to restrict anonymity. In this paper, we consider a ring signature scheme with some "gentle" restrictions, which only prohibits "excessive" anonymity in some applications. Informally, we consider "one-more unforgeability" and "doublespending traceability" in the context of a ring signature.
Initially, these two notions appeared in the context of a blind signature scheme and a restricted blind signature scheme, as in [12] and [14] , respectively. In the blind signature scheme, a user interacts with a signer a number of times and has the signer sign a blind message (in this stage, the signer may know the identity of the user). After the user transformed it to the "blind" signature, it cannot be traced to the user even by the signer. However, the user who obtained the blind signature from the signer cannot generate a "one-more" new signature. This property is called one-more unforgeability. The restricted blind signature has an additional property called "double-spending traceability," so that if a user "spends" a signature twice, he can be traced later [14, 29, 9] . Such a property can be used in the "off-line" anonymous e-cash systems. Note that the identity of a honest user is not threatened, even by the real signer.
We incorporate these properties into the ring signature by introducing formal security requirements.
Our Contribution: Formalization and Construction
In this paper, we introduce the concept of a traceable ring signature. It preserves the flexibility of the ring signature: No group manager, no special setup for sharing secrets among members in a group, and the dynamics of group choice. It implies that the identity of a signer is never escrowed by a special person or group. A traceable ring signature has a tag L = (issue, pk N ), where pk N is the set of public keys of the ring members and issue refers to, for instance, an id of an election or some social issue. A ring member can sign a message using his own secret key and the verifier can verify the signature on the message with respect to tag L, but cannot know who generated the signature among all the possible ring members in L. If the signer signed the same message again with the same tag, everyone can see that the two signatures are linked, whereas if he signed a different message with the same tag, then not only is it evident that they are linked, but the anonymity of the signer is revoked. Informally, the security requirements we provide for this primitive are given below:
• Public Traceability -Anyone who creates two signatures for different messages with respect to the same tag can be traced, where the trace can be done only with pairs of message/signature pairs and the tag.
• Tag-Linkability (One-more unforgeability) -Every two signatures generated by the same signer with respect to the same tag are linked, that is, the total number of signatures with respect to the same tag cannot exceed the total number of ring members in the tag, if every any two signatures are not linked.
• Anonymity -As long as a signer does not sign on two different messages with respect to the same tag, the identity of the signer is indistinguishable from any of the possible ring members. In addition, any two signatures generated with respect to two distinct tags are always unlinkable. Namely, it is infeasible for anyone to determine whether they are generated by the same signer.
• Exculpability -No one can entrap an innocent ring member by outputting the signature(s), such that they designate the target member by using the public traceability procedure. This should be infeasible even if the attacker corrupts all ring members but the target and even after he has seen polynomially-many signatures generated by the target member.
These security goals must be preserved under the attacking model, which is called the adversariallychosen key and ring attack [7] . Recently, Bender, Katz, and Morselli considered new stronger attacking models for the ring signature [7] . Our attacking model is related to their attacking models. In addition, our security model follows their models in the sense that the role of PKI is minimal, namely it only maintains the global public-key list properly, which implies that malicious PKI can't harm a honest signer.
On one hand, our attacking goals (or security goals) are related to those of the group signature [6] . We stress that the standard unforgeability requirement (as in an ordinary ring signature) is unnecessary for the traceable ring signature because the combined requirements for tag-linkability and exculpability imply unforgeability. We give the formal security definitions later in Sec. 2.2.
We show how to construct an efficient and conceptually-simple traceable ring signature scheme on an ordinary Abelian group, on which the DDH and discrete logarithm problems are hard, by using the Fiat-Shamir transformation.
Applications
There are several applications for the traceable ring signature.
An anonymous voting on a BBS -Suppose that some group of people is discussing some issue on a bulletin board via the Internet and wish to vote anonymously among themselves on that issue. They could write to the bulletin board anonymously; however, they do not want to engage a trusted party or establish a heavy setup protocol just for this vote. In addition, it is expected that some people in the group won't vote. An ordinary ring signature cannot be used here because it cannot restrict a member to only one vote. A traceable ring signature however can be applied to this case 1 .
A dishonest whistle-blower problem -The ring signature allows secrets to be leaked anonymously. However, a malicious or irresponsible person may distribute misleading information. Suppose that a high-ranking official leaks secret information to journalist Alice. She makes this information public as coming from someone reputable while protecting the anonymity of the source based on the ring signature generated by the official with respect to the ring of all high-ranking officials. At the same time, however, journalist Bob publishes the opposite information with another ring signature with respect to the same ring of all high-ranking officials. Then, Alice and Bob want to know if the inconsistency comes from distinct sources or if they have been fooled by a dishonest person without revealing their sources before they have known betrayal. The traceable ring signature can prevent the official from distributing inconsistent information to both sides and enable Alice and Bob to officially blame him because he can be publicly traced.
An unclonable group identification "without the group manager" -Recently, Damgård, Dupont, and Pedersen proposed the notion of the unclonable group identification [17] . The traceable ring signature can be applied to this application. The original unclonable group identification requires a group manager, but the traceable ring signature does not.
A traceable ring signature scheme is "functionally" related to a restricted blind signature. Hence, it can be applied to a very primitive "off-line" anonymous e-cash system.
Another possible application is, for instance, k-times anonymous authentication [32] . Any traceable ring signature scheme can be efficiently transformed into a traceable ring signature scheme with k-times anonymity defined as in [32] , but see also Sec. 6.2.
Related Works
Linkable ring signatures [24, 34, 25, 33, 4] are closely related to the traceable ring signature. A linkable ring signature scheme is a ring signature scheme with the property that two signatures generated by the same signer with respect to the same ring can be linked, although it doesn't need satisfy the anonymity revocation property. The earlier papers about linkable ring signatures [24, 25] didn't consider a realistic threat that a dishonest signer makes a honest signer accused of "double-spending" (The schemes in [24, 25] are vulnerable to the attack. See Sec. 3, where our first-step protocol is substantially the same as the schemes in [24, 25] ). The recent papers [34, 4] take care of this problem, which makes the security conditions more complicated. Our security definitions of the traceable ring signature works also on the linkable ring signature, if the tracing algorithm is appropriately modified, which implies that the unforgeability requirement is unnecessary also for a linkable ring signature scheme 2 . Recently, Tsang and Wei proposed a short linkable ring signature [33] , based on a short group identification from [18] , which allows for a shorter length of communication than our proposed scheme as the number of the ring members grows huge. Their scheme is, however, not a ring signature in our sense, because it is necessary for a trusted party to set up the parameter of an accumulator and the scheme is vulnerable to a dishonest trusted party 3 . In addition, it doesn't provide public traceability. To our knowledge, only the proposal in [34] seems to satisfy our security conditions including the anonymity revocation property, but our scheme is simpler and more efficient than that scheme.
The restricted blind signature [14, 29, 9, 27] , including its variant [32] , is functionally related to the traceable ring signature. In the restricted blind signature, however, the user must interact with the signer (corresponding to the group manager) to obtain a blind signature, which corresponds to a special setup with the group manager. This setup may seem somehow similar to the registration to PKI. In particular, the k-times anonymous authentication [32] is closer, because it allows a user to use the "blind signature" permanently (similar to a public-key), once he obtained it from the signer. However, the (restricted) blind signature, including the k-times anonymous authentication, cannot allow ad-hoc group formation. After the signer issues the blind signatures to the user, an arbitrary subgroup including the user cannot be selected as a ring and the services cannot be exclusively restricted to the subgroup.
Recently, Damgård, Dupont, and Pedersen proposed unclonable group identification [17] . It is functionally very close to the k-times anonymous authentication in the sense that after a user obtains a "coin" from the group manager, he can utilize it permanently. However, it does not allow for ad-hoc group formation, either.
A traceable signature scheme [21] is a group signature scheme with traceability (in particular, from a signature to a user), but it requires a group manager.
2 Traceable Ring Signature: Definitions
Notations and Syntax
For probabilistic algorithm A, we write y ← A(x 1 , . . . , x n ) to denote the experiment of running A for given (x 1 , . . . , x n ), selecting r uniformly from an appropriate domain, and assigning the result of this experiment to the variable y, i.e., y := A(x 1 , . . . , x n ; r). For probability spaces, X 1 , . . . , X k , and k-ary predicate φ, we write Pr[ 
is negligible in k. For ordered finite set S, we denote by a S vector (a i ) i∈S . For n ∈ N, we often write N to denote an ordered set (1, . . . , n).
We refer to an ordered public key set pk N = (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ) as a ring. We define a traceable ring signature scheme as indicated below.
Syntax. A traceable ring signature scheme is a tuple of algorithms, Σ = (Gen, Sig,Ver, Trace), such that, for k ∈ N, the following is true.
• Gen: A probabilistic polynomial-time (in k) algorithm that takes security parameter k ∈ N and outputs a public/secret-key pair (pk, sk).
• Sig: A probabilistic polynomial-time (in k) algorithm that takes a secret key, sk i , where i ∈ N , tag L = (issue, pk N ), and message m ∈ {0, 1} * , and that outputs signature σ.
• Ver: A deterministic polynomial-time (in k) algorithm that takes tag L = (issue, pk N ), message m ∈ {0, 1} * , and signature σ, and outputs a bit.
• Trace: A deterministic polynomial-time (in k) algorithm that takes tag L = (issue, pk N ), and two message/signature pairs, {(m, σ), (m , σ )}, and outputs one of the following strings: "indep," "linked," or pk, where pk ∈ pk N .
For simplicity, we often write
As an ordinary signature scheme, a traceable ring signature scheme must satisfy the following correctness conditions: For every k ∈ N, every n ∈ N, every i ∈ N := {1, . . . , n}, every issue ∈ {0, 1} * , and every m ∈ {0,
holds with an overwhelming probability (in k) that Ver(L, m, σ) = 1.
Public Traceability -A traceable ring signature scheme requires that the following condition holds: For every k ∈ N, every n ∈ N, every i, i ∈ N := {1, . . . , n}, every issue ∈ {0, 1} * , and every
otherwise .
In addition, if m = m , Trace never output "linked." Public traceability is a correctness condition, that is, it does not assure that the opposite holds. However, if a traceable signature scheme has tag-linkability (as well as public traceability), Trace(L, m, σ, m , σ ) = "indep" implies that these two signatures are generated by different signers. If it has exculpability, Trace(L, m, σ, m , σ ) = pk i implies that they are signed by the same signer i. Note that Trace(L, m, σ, m, σ ) = "linked" doesn't mean that they are always generated by the same signer (because anyone can make a "dead" copy of any signature).
Security Definitions
In this section, we describe the formal security definitions for the traceable ring signature. We give three requirements: tag-linkability, anonymity, and exculpability. As mentioned earlier, the "standard unforgeability" requirement is unnecessary for the traceable ring signature. We discuss this more formally later. The tag-linkability is significantly different from the other two requirements in the sense that it is to defend the system, not the users. Hence, we assume all users (signers) are potential cheaters, which leads to the model that a central adversary generates all the public/secret keys for the users. On the other hand, anonymity and exculpability are to protect the user(s) from the rest of players, including the system provider and the adversarial users. In these settings, an adversary is given the target public key(s) and allowed to append a polynomial number (in total) of new public keys to the global public-key list in any timing. Possibly, these public-keys can be related to the given target key(s). We assume that the global public-key list is maintained properly: A public-key should be referred to only one user and vice versa. The adversary is basically allowed to choose an arbitrary subring in the global public-key list, when it accesses the signing oracle(s) with respect to the target user(s). We call such an attack the adversarially-chosen-key-and-ring attack, which is inspired by Bender, Katz, and Morselli [7] for new strong attacking models for the ring signature. Our security model also follows their models in the sense that the role of PKI is minimal, namely it only maintains the global public-key list properly, which implies that security requirements hold true against malicious PKI.
We give the formal definitions of the security requirements as follows.
Tag-Linkability -Let F be a probabilistic algorithm modeled as an adversary. It takes security parameter k ∈ N and outputs L = (issue, pk N ) and (n + 1) message/signature pairs,
We define the advantage of F against Σ to be
where Expt F (k) are:
. . , n + 1}, and
Definition 2.1 We say that Σ is tag-linkable if for any probabilistic polynomial-time (in
Anonymity -Let D be a probabilistic algorithm modeled as an adversary. Let (pk 0 , pk 1 ) be the two target public keys, where (pk 0 , sk 0 ) and (pk 1 , sk 1 ) are generated by Gen(1 k ). Let b ∈ {0, 1} be a random hidden bit. D starts the game with target (pk 0 , pk 1 ). D may do the following things polynomial number of times in an arbitrary order: D may append new public keys to the global public-key list and may access three signing oracles, Sig sk b , Sig sk 0 , and Sig sk 1 , where
• Sig sk b is the challenge signing oracle with respect to sk b for signing (L, m), and
• Sig sk 0 (resp. Sig sk 1 ) is the signing oracle with respect to sk 0 (resp. sk 1 ) for signing (L, m).
Here we assume that L should include both pk 0 , pk 1 ; that is, pk 0 , pk 1 ∈ pk N for L = (issue, pk N ). In addition, the following condition must hold:
Finally, D outputs a bit b . We define the advantage of D against Σ as [7] , because the strongest definition requires that an adversary cannot distinguish which target generated the signature even when the adversary is given one of the target secrets; namely, all but one secret key in the ring is exposed. This condition and the public traceability cannot hold simultaneously.
Exculpability -Let A be a probabilistic algorithm as an adversary. Let pk be the target public key where (pk, sk) is generated by Gen(1 k ). A starts the game with the target pk. A may do the following things a polynomial number of times in an arbitrary order. A may append new public keys to the global public-key list and may ask the signing oracle with respect to sk, Sig sk , to sign any (L,m), whereL = (ĩssue, pkÑ ), only with the restriction that pk ∈ pkÑ . Finally, A outputs two pairs, (L, m, σ) and (L, m , σ ), where L = (issue, pk N ). Here they should satisfy pk ∈ pk N , Ver(L, m, σ) = 1, and Ver(L, m , σ ) = 1. In addition, the following conditions cannot occur.
• Both pairs, (L, m, σ) and (L, m , σ ), exist in the query/answer list between A and Sig sk , or
• There exists (L, m,σ) and (L, m ,σ ) in the query/answer list between A and Sig sk and they are linked to (L, m, σ) and (L, m , σ ), respectively. It is, however, allowed that one of them is linked to one of the outputs of A.
We say that A entraps a player with respect to pk if Trace(L, m, σ, m , σ ) = pk. We define the advantage of A against Σ, to be 
Discussion
As mentioned earlier, a standard unforgeability requirement (as defined in an ordinary ring signature) is unnecessary for a traceable ring signature scheme. In other words, the unforgeability requirement is not essential for the traceable ring signature. We define unforgeability as the inability of an adversary that takes all public-key pk N and, after having access to the signing oracle with (L, 
. . , n}. If every n + 1 pairs are independent, then it contradicts tag-linkability. Therefore, there is an i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that Trace(L, m, σ, m (i) , σ (i) ) = pk ∈ pk N , because m (i) = m (Remember that Trace never outputs "linked" if m (i) = m). This case, however, contradicts the exculpability requirement, because we can construct adversary A against exculpability, by using A as a black box oracle as follows. For simplicity, we assume, without loss of generality, that A takes all public-keys as the targets, as discussed in Remark 2.5. A feeds all public-keys to A . For any query of A , A asks the signing oracle the answer and returns it to A . A finally outputs (L, m, σ), where L = (issue, pk N ). Then, A asks for n queries and obtains (L, m (1) 
We note that a traceable ring signature always provides efficient confirmation and disavowal protocols (where we don't assume that these protocol are zero-knowledge). If a member of the ring wants to prove a signature is generated by himself, he makes another signature for a different message with the same tag, which reveals his identity. Similarly, if a member of the ring wants to prove a signature is not generated by himself, he submit another signature for an arbitrary message with the same tag, which is independent of the previous signature. In some application it is undesirable, but any anonymous authentication primitive with public traceability (or linkability) cannot avoid this property, such as a linkable ring signature, a blind signature, unclonable group identification and k-times anonymous authentication.
Towards Our Scheme
Although our proposal is not very complicated, we construct our scheme step by step to understand more easily the concept behind our design.
Let us keep in mind the undeniable signature scheme proposed by Chaum [13] : Letting y i = g x i ∈ G be a public key of player i, the Chaum's undeniable signature on message M is
where H denotes a hash function. Now let M = issue||pk N where pk N = (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ) are a vector of n public-keys. Pick up at random (n−1) elements, σ j 's, from G, where j = i. Then, set a NP-language
where h = H(issue||y N ) and σ N = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ).
Then, consider a zero-knowledge based signature (using secret x i ) on this language. It is well-known that such a signature can be constructed by applying the technique of Cramer et al. [16] (one-out-of n honest-verifier zero-knowledge) to the Fiat-Shamir technique. The signature on m is then (σ N , p), where p = (c, z) is a (non-interactive) proof on L and c = H (σ N , a, m) , where a is computed by p. We call this our first-step construction.
Suppose now that this scheme is applied to anonymous voting on BBS, where each user can write on BBS anonymously. Let L = (issue, pk N ), where issue denotes the vote id number and pk N corresponds to the authorized voters. Each voter simply sends message "yes" or "no" along with signature (σ N , p) to a bulletin board via a sender-anonymous channel (such as the Internet in practice). If proof p is sound, a cheating player, say i, could not vote twice because it turns out σ i = σ i = h x i , which takes the risk of revealing his identity.
However, this construction does not work well when an adversary is one of the voters. The problem is that an adversarial player, say j, can entrap an innocent player, say i, or at least void the first vote, with a significant probability. Player j waits for someone to send the first vote, say (" yes, (σ N , p) ), to the bulletin board. After seeing this signature, he generate a valid signature (σ N , p ) on message "no," using secret key x j , following a valid signing procedure, except that he sets σ i = σ i and σ k = σ k for all k = i. He then sends ("no, σ N , p ) to the board. If the first vote is really generated by player i, player i cannot deny the second vote, because the second vote is a valid signature potentially generated by player i. At least, player i would lose his first vote, because he cannot prove which of two votes are valid.
Our solution is to make signer i fix every σ j , j = i, depending on (L, m) and σ i . More precisely, each point (j, log h (σ j )) is forced to be on the line defined by (i, log h (σ i )) and (0, log h (H (L, m) 
)).
Intuitively, to generate a signature that will pass verification, player i must set σ i = h x i , while to entrap player j, he must set at the same time that (j, log h (σ j )) lies on the line defined by (i, log h (σ i )) and (0, log h (H(L, m))), which seems intractable. On the other hand, suppose that signer i generates two signatures, σ N and σ N , on m and m , m = m , with respect to the same tag L. Every (j, log h (σ j )) derived from the first σ N lies on the line defined by (i, log h (σ i )) and (0, log h (H(L, m))), whereas every (j, log h (σ j )) derived from the second σ N does on the line defined by (i, log h (σ i )) and (0, log h (H(L, m ))). Since the first line intersects with the second line at (i, log h (σ i )) and these are not the same line (because H(L, m) = H(L, m )), it holds that σ i = σ i and σ j = σ j for all j = i, which implies that the identity of the cheating player is traced. We formally prove in Sec. 5 that this approach successfully works. Interestingly, this scheme is more efficient than the first-step construction described above in terms of communication traffic.
An Efficient Traceable Ring Signature Scheme
In this section, we describe our proposal.
Let G be a multiplicative group of prime order q and let g be a generator of G. Let H : {0, 1} * → G, H : {0, 1} * → G, and H : {0, 1} * → Z q be distinct hash functions (modeled as random oracles in the security statements below). These above are public parameters.
The key generation for player i is as follows: Player i picks up random element x i in Z q and computes y i = g x i . The public key of i is pk i = {g, y i , G} and the corresponding secret key is sk i = {pk i , x i }. The player i registers his public-key to PKI.
We denote by N = {1, . . . , n} an ordered list of n players. We let pk N = (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ) be an ordered public-key list for set N . Let issue be an arbitrary string in {0, 1} * .
Signing protocol : To sign message m ∈ {0, 1} * with respect to tag L = (issue, pk N ), using the secret-key sk i , proceed as follows:
Notice that every (j, log h (σ j )) is on the line defined by (0, log h (A 0 )) and (i, x i ), where x i = log h (σ i ). N , z N ) on (L, m) , based on a (non-interactive) zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for the relation derived from language
Generate signature (c
where σ N = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ), as follows:
(b) Pick up at random z j , c j ← Z q , and set a j = g z j y 3. Output pk if pk is the only entry in TList; "linked" else if TList = pk N ; "indep" otherwise (i.e., TList = ∅ or 1 < #TList < n).
Security
In this section, we give security proofs for our traceable ring signature scheme. Before proving tag-linkability for our scheme, we prove the following useful lemmas. We consider adversary A against our signature scheme above. A is given 1 k and allowed to access the random oracles, H and H , at most q H and q H times, respectively. Here it is not necessary that A is polynomial-time bounded. Then, we have the following lemmas. A outputs valid pair (L, m, σ) .
Lemma 5.1 Suppose that

The probability that #{i
where the probability is taken over the choices of H , H and the inner coin tosses of A.
, c i is determined. Hence, Case 1 implies that all c i 's, where i ∈ N , are uniquely determined. Since H is a random oracle, for any given (L, m,
, is at most q −1 . Therefore, for any A with at most q H queries to random oracle H , the probability of Case 1 is at most
. Case 2 implies that at least two points, (i, log g (y i ))'s, are on the line, which means, when pk N are fixed, the line is determined, so log h (A 0 ) and log h (A 1 ) are determined. However, we also need log h (A 0 ) = log h (H (L(issue, pk N ), m) ), where H (L, m) is determined independently of the above line, because H is a random oracle. Actually, the probability that log h (H (L, m)) = log h (A 0 ) is at most q −1 for given (L, m). Hence, for any adversary A with at most q H number of queries to random oracle H , the probability of Case 2 is at most q H q . (1) , σ (1) ) and (L, m (2) , σ (2) ), such that Trace(L, m (1) , σ (1) , m (2) , σ (2) ) = "indep". Let TList be the list defined above in our tracing protocol.
Lemma 5.2 Suppose A is defined above and it outputs (L, m
Then, the probability that 1 < #TList is
, where the probability is taken over the choices of H and the inner coin tosses of A.
Proof. By 1 < #TList, the line defined by σ (1) intersects with the line defined by σ (2) at least at two points, which means that the two lines coincide. Hence, A
. Therefore, the advantage of A is bounded by the probability that A can find a collision of outputs of H , which is Proof. Suppose for contradiction that there is adversary F that takes 1 k and successfully outputs tag L = (issue, pk N ) and {(m (1) , σ (1) 
k , which contradicts the assumption (if the advantage of F exceeds max(
Therefore, the probability that F can forge the proposed scheme above is at most max(
, where q H and q H denotes the number of queries of F to random oracles, H and H , respectively.
Before proceeding other theorems, we define a protocol, commonly used in some of the following proofs. We now show the following theorem. . We now construct an algorithm A to solve the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. Let (g 1 , g 2 , u, v) be a given instance, where g 1 , g 2 , u, v ∈ G. When (g 1 , g 2 , u, v) is a DDH tuple, log g 1 (u) = log g 2 (v) holds. We construct A as follows: 5. In case D submits a fresh query to random oracles, H and H , A picks up random elements in G and Z q respectively, to reply with. Then, A stores the query/answer pairs in the lists, Q H and Q H , respectively.
6. In case D submits a fresh query to random oracle H, A picks up at random r 1 , r 2 ← Z q and returns g 1 r 1 g 2 r 2 . Then, A stores the value as well as (r 1 , r 2 ) in query/answer list Q H .
In this simulation, if A picks up the same g L, h, σ N ) ) | ∃ i ∈ N such that log g (y i ) = log h (σ i ).}, following procedure SimNIZK described above to get (c N , z N ), where c N = (c 1 , . . . , c n ) and  z N = (z 1 , . . . , z n ) . If SimNIZK succeeds, A returns σ = (A 1 , c N , z N ) to D, otherwise A halts. The advantage of A against the DDH problem is defined as
We say that A succeeds in simulation if no collision happens in simulating random oracle H and SimNIZK succeeds in simulating proofs for all queries of D to the signing oracles. SimNIZK fails in generating a proof with at most probability q H q , where q H denotes the total number of queries of D to H . Hence, the probability that SimNIZK fails at least once in this game is bounded by
, where q Sig denotes the total number of queries of D to the signing oracles. We evaluate the following probabilities on the condition that A succeeds in simulation. Notice that if (g 1 , g 2 , u, v) is a DDH tuple and a reply of the signing oracles, Sig sk b , Sig sk 0 , and Sig sk 1 , is identical to the real signature using sk b , sk 0 , and sk 1 , respectively (on the condition that SimNIZK succeeds in simulating a proof).
On the other hand, if it is a random tuple, hidden bit b is perfectly independent of the adversary's view.
Hence, we have Pr
Based on this estimation, the advantage of A is 1 2 · , if A succeeds in simulation. Therefore, the advantage of A is bounded by
To suppress the advantage of A to be negligible in k, must be negligible in k.
Before proceeding to the exculpability statement, we prove the following lemma. Let A be an adversary against exculpability for our scheme. Let q H , q H denote the total number of queries to the random oracles, H , H , respectively. Here it is not necessary that A is polynomial-time bounded. Then, we have the following. Lemma 5.5 When A entraps player i, the probability that log h (σ i ) = log g (y i ) is at most
The probability is taken over the choices of H , H and the inner coin tosses of A.
Proof. Assume that log h (σ i ) = log g (y i ). Based on lemma 5.1, if Ver(L, m, σ) = 1, the probability that #{i ∈ N | log h (σ i ) = log g (y i )} < 1 is at most q H q . Hence, for σ and σ that A outputs, there are j, k ∈ N , with an overwhelming probability, such that log h (σ j ) = log g (y j ) and log h (σ k ) = log g (y k ), which implies that
Since log h (σ i ) = log g (y i ), it holds that j, k = i.
By (1), (2), and (3), we have
where A, B, C are fixed when i, j, k, log g (y j ) and log g (y k ) are fixed. Remember
) and log g (y k ) are fixed. Hence, the probability that A 0 and A 0 satisfy (4) is at most
, because H is a random oracle. The probability that A 0 , A 0 satisfy (4) is the same in every j, k ∈ N − {i}, j = k; Hence, the probability that log h (σ i ) = log g (y i ) is at most
q . When adversary A entraps player i, there are two possibilities: One is the case that A really forges the signature of player i (possibly, after seeing her/his real signature). Namely, it is the case that log h (σ i ) = log h (σ i ) = log g (y i ). The other case log h (σ i ) = log h (σ i ) = log g (y i ), means that A does not forge the signatures of player i but, letting σ, σ be generated by A, the i-th entries of them, σ i and σ i , are the same. This lemma implies that if A entraps player i, it is the case, with an overwhelming probability, that A has really forged a signature of player i. A very rough strategy for proving the theorem is as follows: Based on lemma 5.5, we know that if an adversary A against exculpability for our scheme can entraps the target player i, then it is the case with an overwhelming probability that A has actually forged a signature of player i, i.e., log h σ i = log g y i . In addition, by lemma 5.1, we realize that that it is "never" a potential signature of any other player at the same time, i.e., log h σ j = log g y j , for j = i (with an overwhelming probability).
This implies that by the standard rewinding, we have c i = c i for the target i, which breaks the discrete log of the target y i and leads to the contradiction.
Proof. Suppose that there is adversary A that takes pk and entraps the player with respect to pk. Then, we can construct algorithm A that solves the discrete logarithm problem. Let g, Y ∈ G be a given instance of discrete logarithm problem. The goal of A is to output log g Y . We construct A as follows.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the id number of the target player is i. Hence, A sets y i := Y and feeds pk i = {y i , g} to adversary A.
A may access the random oracles, H, H , H , and the signing oracle, at most q H , q H , q H and q Sig times, respectively. In case A submits a fresh query to random oracles, H and H , A picks up random elements in G and Z q respectively, to use as a reply, maintaining the query/answer lists, Q H and Q H , respectively. In case A submits a fresh query to random oracle H, A picks up random v ∈ Z q and return g v to A, maintaining query/answer list Q H . In case A submits query (L,m), to the signing oracle, A returns σ as follows.
and H (L,m) have been already booked in Q H and Q H , respectively, use these stored values. (L, m, A 0 , A 1 , a N , b N ) , A halts. However, this occurs only with probability q −1 . Then, A runs A again on the same random coins except that c := H (L, m, A 0 , A 1 , a N , b N ) . There is some probability that A finally outputs (L, m, σ ) (and another pair (L, ., .)) such that σ = (A 1 , c N , z N ) . As studied in [30] , such an event happens with probability We now claim that the probability that c i = c i is overwhelming in k: By lemma 5.5, if adversary A entraps player i, it is the case with an overwhelming probability that A has really forged the signature of player i; namely, log h (σ i ) = log g (y i ). On one hand, since c = c , there is at least a t ∈ N , such that c t = c t . By lemma 5.1, however, the possibility that #{i ∈ N | log h (σ i ) = log g (y i )} > 1 is at most q H q . Therefore, we conclude t = i because at least, log h (σ i ) = log g (y i ).
To sum up, the success probability of A is bounded by
To suppress the advantage of A to be negligible in k, , the advantage of A, must be negligible in k. 
k-Times Anonymity on the Same Tag
Any traceable ring signature scheme can be efficiently transformed into a traceable ring signature scheme with k-times anonymity in the sense of [32] , where the k-times anonymity means that a signer is allowed to sign messages with respect to the same tag at most k times without being traced. It is simply obtained by regarding (i, Sig sk ((L, i), m)) as a signature on m, with respect to tag L, where the verifier checks if Ver((L, i), m) = 1 and 1 ≤ i ≤ k (Here the signer need not publish i in order). It is obvious that the identity of a signer is not revealed if the signer is enough careful not to issue the same index twice on the same tag. We, however, remark that this implementation has a weakness in the unlinkability property, while it satisfies the condition of the k-time anonymity defined in [32] , because whether or not the two signatures are generated by the different signers can be easily determined, if the two signatures have the same tag and index. The scheme appeared in [32] substantially has the same problem, too.
